Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1999

Concern for Cause: A Comment on the Twerski-Sebok Plan for
Administering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun
Manufacturers
Benjamin C. Zipursky
Fordham University School of Law, bzipursky@law.fordham.edu

John Goldberg
Harvard Law School, jgoldberg@law.harvard.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Benjamin C. Zipursky and John Goldberg, Concern for Cause: A Comment on the Twerski-Sebok Plan for
Administering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun Manufacturers, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1411 (1999)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/836

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Concern for Cause: A Comment on the Twerski-Sebok
Plan for Administering Negligent Marketing Claims
Against Gun Manufacturers

JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG" & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY'
I. INTRODUCTION

In their timely and thoughtful article, Professors Twerski and Sebok
make four claims. First, they rightly point out that the most workaday
element of negligence--cause-in-fact-figures as centrally to the resolution of negligent marketing claims against gun manufacturers as policyladen issues such as duty and market share liability! On their analysis of
the evidence produced by plaintiffs in the few cases that have gone forward, it appears that any negligence on the part of gun manufacturers has
increased only slightly the risk to the general population of injury by
wrongful shooting. As a result, even if plaintiffs can establish that manufacturers owed them a duty of care and breached that duty, few, if any, will
be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the breach of duty
caused the shootings and injuries of which they complain.
Twerski and Sebok next consider the potential relevance of Wex
Malone's famous Realist-inspired thesis that, as a matter of practice rather
than mere 'paper' rules, judges permit certain classes of plaintiffs to recover without satisfying the causation element On their reconstruction,
Associate Professorof Law, Vanderbilt University.
Associate ProfessorofLaw, Fordham Universty. 7Te authors thard:Professors Tyerksl and
Sebokfor inviting this respons particularlygiven that they knew w would use the occasion to register our disagreementwith their analysiL
1. See Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminitlons on
Cause-in-Factas Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1379 (2000). Twerski and Sebok
provide a great service not only by drawing attention to the importance to these cases of cause-in-fact,
but also by emphasizing that there is an issue of causation that poses a problem distinct from the isstt
of market share liability.
2. In particular, they focus on Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (appeal
pending). Hamilton is the only case yet to reach ajury verdict favorable to a plaintiff. Tw'ski and
Sebok also discuss Merrill v. Navegar,Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 146 (Cal. CL App. 1999), review granted,
991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000). Because Navegar may raise distinct issues, we will focus our discussion on
Hamilton.
*

**
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the Malone thesis is that judges will wink at questionable jury findings of
causation, but only in cases featuring: (1) a meaningful possibility (as opposed to a probability, on the one hand, and a near-zero chance on the
other) that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiffs injury; (2) a
particularly culpable defendant; (3) the realization of a risk that falls
squarely within the class of risks that the defendant was supposed to guard
against; and (4) a fact pattern that is not likely to recur on a large scale. In
short, according to Malone, courts will, in the name of deterrence and
compensation, tolerate ad hoc departures from the causation requirement
when confronted with some evidence of possible causation and a defendant
'deserving' of sanction anyway, albeit only in cases confined to a selfcontained comer of negligence law, such that the nullification of causation
is neither particularly noticeable, nor likely to produce ruinous levels of
liability.
Third, Twerski and Sebok argue that, even assuming Malone was right
to identify this pattern of ad hoc exemption, it offers little precedential or
predictive basis for concluding that plaintiffs should or will recover from
gun manufacturers on a theory of negligent marketing. This is because the
possibility that the manufacturers' negligence injured any given shooting
victim is extremely small, and because negligent marketing claims against
gun manufacturers already constitute a mass tort, or soon will. Thus, even
if courts find that gun manufacturers who market negligently are particularly deserving of sanction, they will not be able to justify permitting recovery on the ground that they are merely massaging negligence doctrine
in a few isolated and close cases. Nor can courts presume that individual
tort awards will, when aggregated, stay within manageable bounds.
Fourth and finally, the authors suggest the existence of an alternative
legal and policy basis for permitting recovery in these cases, namely a version of the "loss-of-chance" doctrine articulated in decisions including
Falcon v. Memorial Hospital,3 and a concurrence in Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop.4 Under this variant, a patient alleging negligent failure to
diagnose or treat disease may recover from her physician even if the
chance of recovery that is lost due to the malpractice is less than fifty percent, but she may only recover a partial damage award for the "lost
chance," i.e., a percentage of the full compensatory award she would have
received that corresponds to the percentage decrease in her chance of recovery that flowed from the physician's negligence.5 Thus, Twerski and
Sebok maintain that plaintiffs alleging negligent marketing of guns ought
to be able to recover under a loss-of-chance theory, yet are barred as a
matter of doctrinal logic from recovering more than apro rata share of the
3. 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990).
4. 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
5. See Herskovits,664 P.2d at 486-87 (Pearson, J., concurring).
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aggregate harm that the gun manufacturers have negligently facilitated. 6
For this reason, they conclude by sharply criticizing Judge Weinstein's
opinion in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek7 which, at least in principle, permits an
award of full compensation.8
HI.
The analysis provided by Twerski and Sebok is appealing in two ways.
First, it presents an argument apparently grounded in negligence law that
would seem to permit recovery in a novel litigation context In part, it does
this by presenting the gun litigation as an incremental doctrinal step forward from the loss-of-chance cases. It also purports to demonstrate this by
explaining how limited recovery serves both deterrence and compensation,
two goals commonly ascribed to tort law. Second, the Twerski-Sebok
analysis is attractive as a policy prescription, because it displays a progressive willingness to entertain the prospect of gun liability, yet does so in a
manner sensitive to practical concerns about ruinous liability.
Unfortunately, we think that neither of the two grounds that support
this surface appeal withstands scrutiny. The proposed scheme of pro rata
recovery is not supported by an incremental move within tort doctrine.
Rather, it would use an already controversial doctrine developed in the
specific context of medical malpractice to foment a revolution in the lav of
negligence. The pro rata recovery scheme also does not qualify as negligence law simply because it serves what Twerski and Sebok posit to be the
aims of tort law. To begin with, their account of tort law's primary goals is
itself contested. Moreover, their implicit further claim--that the law in any
given negligence case is nothing other than the result that best serves those
functions-is extreme and implausible. Even as pure policy prescription,
the proposal for wholesale judicial adoption of a pro rata compensation
scheme suffers from a failure to acknowledge basic considerations that
might weigh against its adoption altogether, or at least counsel against its
implementation through a court decision.
6. For example, if one imagines all handguns are produced by a single manufacturer, and that its
negligence can be shown to have increased the amount of damage associated with all vwongful shootings by $1 million, and if we assume a total pool of 1,000 wrongful shooting victims, then each victim/plaintiff should recover $1,000.
7. 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).

8. In Hamilton,Judge Weinstein entertained the adoption of apro rata approa*h, but concluded
that he did not need to invoke it because the successful plaintiffs, Steven and Gall Fox, had presented

evidence sufficient for ajury to find that the negligence of three gun manufacturers was a substantial
factor in bringing about their injuries. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 802. Because Hamilton was
tried on a market share theory of liability, and because the jury assigned liability to only three mamufacturers with relatively small shares of the market for .25 caliber handguns, the plaintiffs received only
about 13% of the $4 million damage award. See Id at 811. This may help explain why Judge Weinstein was unconcerned about permitting the jury to award full compensatory damages.
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We do not offer these criticisms out of a conviction that negligence
claims by shooting victims against gun manufacturers lack merit. It is
surely a great virtue of the common law of torts that it evolves, and some
of these cases may provide instances in which evolution is called for.
Rather, we only wish to make clear that, at this point, the judicial adoption
of a scheme ofpro rata recovery would constitute the abandonment of the
causation element of negligence law. Thus, such a course of action must
be understood and evaluated for what it is: not a context-sensitive extension of negligence law, but a radical, policy-driven replacement of it.
II.
According to their reading of the evidence presented in the Hamilton
litigation, Twerski and Sebok conclude that plaintiffs thus far have at most
established that any negligence on the part of gun manufacturers has only
slightly increased the aggregate risk of wrongful shootings.' If so, the
plaintiffs fell well short of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a
but-for causal link between given instances of negligent marketing and the
injuries that any of them sustained.
Moreover, Twerski and Sebok seem right to conclude that the plaintiffs' claims will fail even granted Malone's point that courts do at times
undertake relaxed "sufficiency of the evidence" review ofjuries' causation
findings.' Employing standard New York jury instructions, Judge Weinstein told the Hamiltonjury that they could find that the defendants' negligence caused the plaintiffs' injuries so long as they concluded that it was a
"substantial factor" in bringing about those injuries." This instruction is
apparently intended to capture the idea that, in some cases at least, juries
have substantial leeway to draw conclusions about causation from the evidence and from common sense.' Yet if Twerski and Sebok are right about
9. See Twerski & Sebok, suqra note 1,at 1402-04.
10. For an influential early example of a relaxed approach to sufficiency of the evidence, see
Zinnel v. UnitedStates Shpping Board,10 F2d 47 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.). In Zinnel, the alleged
negligence was the failure of the boat owner to provide guard ropes to prevent the plaintiff's decedent
from being washed off of a deck-load of timber on which he was standing. Judge Hand reasoned that,
in light of evidence showing that the area where the seaman was standing was struck only by shallow
white water (as opposed to being swamped by "green water"), the jury was permitted to conclude that
the seaman probably would have been able to save himself had there been a rope. See Id.at 48-49.
11. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 848.
12. Somewhat confusingly, it is perhaps also meant to capture the 'proximate cause' doctrine that
there can be more than one negligent but-for cause of a given injury, as well as unusual cases Involving
the merger of two distinct necessary and sufficient causes (e.g., 'joining fires' cases). See Kadyszewksl
v. Ellis Hosp. Ass'n, 595 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (App. Div. 1993) (defendant's negligence "need not be the
sole cause of plaintiff's injury; it need only have been a substantial factor in bringing about the Injury,
i.e., a proximate cause as distinguished from the proximate cause.") (citation omitted); see also DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 168, 171, at 409,415 (2000) (suggesting that these are functions served
by the substantial factor test).
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the evidence, then the Hamilton plaintiffs failed even to clear the substantial factor hurdle.
Twerski and Sebok thus seem correct to conclude that an alternative
doctrinal basis is needed to support recovery in cases like Hamilton. However, they are wrong to assert that one is readily at hand in the "loss-ofchance" doctrine developed in medical malpractice cases. In the first
place, as they concede, there are many jurisdictions that have not recognized the Falcon model of loss-of-chance, including perhaps New York."
While New York courts have permitted recovery in some cases in which
the plaintiff's expert, contending that the defendant injured the plaintiff,
did not testify to probabilities of greater than 50%, these courts have not
treated chance of recovery as a good in itself, and have not endorsed proportional recovery." Rather, they seem to have treated these cases more or
less as Judge Weinstein handled Hamilton-not by invoking a separate
loss-of-chance doctrine, but by employing the "substantial factor" test to
support deferential sufficiency-of-the-evidence review on the question of
causation."5 And, as we have just seen, Twerski and Sebok conclude that
13. See DOBBS, .supra note 12, § 178, 434-35 (surveying case law). Twerski and Sebok suggest
that Judge Weinstein's "adopt[ion]' ofpro rata recovery in his opinion approving the Agent Orang
settlement provides a "paradigm for proportional recovery." Twerski & Sebok, .ura note 1, at 1394.

To the extent their use of "adopt[ion]" and "paradigm" Is meant to suggest that Judge Weinsten's
decision to apportion the Agent Orange settlement fund on apro rata basis provides a precedent for
characterizing the law of tort causation, their assertion is misleading. Judge Weinstein adopted a partial
pro rata distribution because it was a sensible and equitable admin
re scheme for distributing a
settlement fund, not because it tracked tort rules. Indeed, as he made clear, the plaintiffs' Inability to
prove even a general causal linkage between Agent Orange and most of their injuries entailed that their
cases would fail as a matter of tort doctrine. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp.

740,787 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), af'd,818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). Hence, hewenton to dismiss the actions
of those who opted-out of the settlement largely because the opt-out plaintiffs could not prove causation. The dismissal of these claims as legally insufficient was in turn central to the Second Circuit's
affirmance of the settlement See In re "Agent Orange", 818 F.2d at 149-S1.
14. See, e.g., Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y. S2d 508, 510 (App. Div.), aifd, 374
N.Y.S2d 615 (1975) (holding that a malpractice claim can properly be sent to the jury ,timeplaintiff's
expert testified that plaintiff would have had a "20, say 30, maybe 401s chnce of survival"); Stewartv.
New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 616 N.Y.S2d 499, 500 (App. Div. 1994), Iv. to p. den.
(1995) (approving jury instruction that pain and suffering for lost chance to conceive naturally may be
awarded if it is proved by a "preponderance of the credible evidence" that the chance lost was "sub-

stantial" or "more than slight").
15. See Kallenberg, 357 N.Y.S2d at 511 (articulating the principle of broad deference to Jury
findings as the basis for the court's decision); Mortenson v. Memorial Hosp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 264, 270
(App. Div. 1984) (explaining Kallenbergby reaffirming the need for proof of causation, by endorsing
the substantial factor test and by equating "substantial factor in bringing about injury" with "substantial possibility ofavoiding the injury"); Kimball v. Scors, 399 N.Y.S.2d 350,351 (App. Div.), lv.to app.
den. (1978) (interpreting Kallenberg as a decision about what creates an Issue of fact for the jury); see
also Koster v. Greenberg, 502 N.Y.S.2d 395,397 (App. Div. 1986) (the jury could find actual causation
where there was a "rational basis" for concluding that the defendant's negligence was a but-for cause of
plaintiff's uncured condition, and that the condition "contributed to plaintiffs deih."). Stewart, 616
N.Y.S.2d 499 is perhaps a different type of loss of chance case altogether, in that the plaintiff faced no
difficulty proving causation of a physical injury. Arguably, the Issue there was whether a small de-
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this sort of6 deference will provide no help to plaintiffs such as those in
Hamilton.1
Even if we were to assume the availability of a genuine "loss-of-

chance" doctrine, it would not support proportionate recovery in the gunliability scenario. To the extent that rulings in Falconand cases like it are
plausible, it is because, in the context of medical malpractice, "loss-ofchance" designates a particular kind of injury that the plaintiff suffers,
typically "loss of the chance of surviving some serious illness." This injury is distinct from the adverse outcome itself (i.e., death from the illness),
while obviously related to it. It is a certain kind of opportunity to avoid

it. 7 The injury of which the plaintiff complains against the physician is
that of not giving her the chance to survive to which she was entitled.

Hence, these are not cases of negligence in the air-cases where the defendant has acted negligently but the tortious nature of the action remains inchoate and unconnected to the plaintiff's well-being (as might be the case
with a failed attempt). On the contrary, there is a sense in which the malpractice has actually injured the plaintiff by depriving her of a chance to

survive.
The point made here is not normative: we take no position on whether

the loss-of-chance doctrine ought to be adopted because a loss-of-achance-of-survival really is the sort of injury that can support a claim of

malpractice. Our point is an interpretive one: courts that adopt this causeof-action are adopting an at-least plausible theory of what constitutes a
particular sort of injury in the malpractice context. Chance-of-survival is
probably understood as a distinct good by physicians and patients. Indeed,

for certain specialties (e.g., oncology) and doctor-patient relationships, it is
precisely the good that the doctor is under a duty to protect. Moreover,
physicians know this: it is part of their deliberation, and what they try to

protect in treating patients. As courts said long ago, and continue to say
crease in the chance of natural childbirth could figure as part of plaintiff's pain and suffering damages.
See LaVista v. Huntington Hosp., 673 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (App. Div. 1998) (so interpreting Stewart).
16. As Twerski and Sebok point out, the most notable departure in New York law from the causation requirement is found in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989), which
permits the imposition of market share liability on even those DES manufacturers that prove they did
not cause harm to the plaintiff. See Twerksi & Sebok, supra note 1,at 1401-02 n.102. Hymowltz Itself
explicitly denied that its ruling on causation augured a broad shift in the New York common law of
tort. See id at 1075 (describing DES litigation as a "singular case"). Indeed, it is quite likely that the
Court of Appeals would never have introduced this innovation without prompting from the state legislature. See id (noting the importance of the enactment of New York's DES revival statute to the
court's decision to impose market share liability). As a result, we see no basis whatsoever for Twerski's and Sebok's assertion that Hymowltz reveals a general receptivity on the part of the New York
Court of Appeals to the judicial replacement of tort law with administrative compensation schemes.
See I
17. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Risk,Harm and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW 321, 339 (David Owen ed., 1995) (suggesting that loss-of-chance cases may plausibly
turn on the fact that lost opportunity to receive proper medical treatment is a distinctive form of harm).
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today, the provision of medical care constitutes an assumpsit or undertaking, and one may plausibly conclude that this undertaking includes a duty
to take care to provide patients with the opportunities for health that good
medical care entails. 8 As the Falcon court explained:
A woman who engages the services of a physician and enters a
hospital to have a child does so to reduce pain and suffering and
to increase the likelihood of her surviving and the child surviving
childbirth in a good state of health even though the likelihood of
the woman and child not surviving in good health without such
services is far less than fifty percent. That is why women go to
physicians. That is what physicians undertake to do."'
The problem for Twerski and Sebok is that one cannot generalize from
"loss-of-chance-of-survival"--an injury that can reasonably be described
as a wrong within the "thick" context of a certain sort of relationship, such
as that of doctor and patient-to a generic loss-of-chance cause of action?0
As one abstracts away from the malpractice context, the salient features
supporting recognition of loss-of-chance as a cognizable harm-an undertaking to monitor and cure, an understanding of chance-of-survival as a
good by doctor and patient, an imbalance of information and expertise,
justified reliance--simply vanish. Once rendered generic, loss-of-chance
no longer plausibly describes a wrongful injury supporting a claim in tort
against a product-supplier such as a gun manufacturer. The slight increase
in risk of being shot as one moves from the world of non-negligent distribution to the world of negligent distribution is not a deprivation of a good
that forms a meaningful feature of a person's life. Nor does anyone-victim, manufacturer, or court-regard it as such. To label the plaintiffs'
claims in a case like Hamilton as complaining of a "loss-of-chance" is to
play word games. In this context, advocating recovery for a lost chance is
just a different way of asking the courts to water down the standards of
proof of causation so as to achieve a policy goal such as deterrence or
compensation. It is therefore not a natural extension of the negligence law
of New York or any other jurisdiction.

18. See A.D. KmALFY, THE ACTION ON THE CASE 13841 (1951) (describing the Ida of undertaking to cure as the basis for malpractice actions brought under the medieval writ of Trespss on the
Case).
19. Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 52. Thus understood, the loss-of-chience cases do not rahirally or
logically entail proportionate recovery, as Twerski and Sebok suggest See Twasskl & Scbok, pzra
note 1, at 1388. Indeed, in light of the nature of the injury, particularly In cases of cgrtglous rni-prc-

tice,
a higher level of award might well be appropriate. See DOBBS, supra note 12, § 178, _i435 (noting courts that permit full compensation in loss-of-chance malpractice cases).
20. On the relationship-sensitivity of tort duties and wrongs, s John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin
C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L REV. 1733, 1825-39 (1998).
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IV.
Another aspect of the surface appeal of Twerski's and Sebok's proposal is that it seems agreeable to one standard account of tort law's functions. Specifically, the imposition of pro rata liability on negligent gun
manufacturers, at least when considered in the aggregate, seems to serve
neatly the goals of deterrence and compensation by making the manufacturers internalize the 'cost' of their negligence, while providing at least
some compensation to the injured. However, even if Twerski and Sebok
were jiistified in reaching this conclusion, they would not be justified in
claiming to derive theirproratascheme from the law of torts. Rather, they
derive it by conflating the substance of tort doctrine with a particular theoretical account of the goals it is meant to serve.
The collapse of tort law into its supposed aims is a hallmark of a particular set of Realist-inspired theories of tort, which can be grouped under
the broad heading of instrumentalism. Instrumentalist theories conceive of
tort law as nothing other than a regulatory device for simultaneously deterring undesirable conduct and providing compensation to victims of such
conduct. On the instrumentalist account, causation-like every other tort
element-is important only to the extent that it allows tort law to serve its
goals. Thus, it tends to treat the loss-of-chance cases as ones in which the
normally useful causation requirement suddenly threatens to become dysfunctional in that it promises to bar the imposition of liability and the distribution of compensation in cases that involve negligent actors and injured
plaintiffs. Loss-of-chance cases, on the instrumentalist view, seem to call
for judicial innovation to ensure that mere considerations of 'form' do not
prevent tort law from achieving its policy goals.
Still, the loss-of-chance cases pose the instrumentalist with a dilemma
at the level of policy. For, if insistence on proof of causation entails underdeterrence and undercompensation, outright abolition of that requirement promises overdeterrence and overcompensation. Once relieved of the
burden of proving causation, each loss-of-chance plaintiff stands in principle to recover full compensation, even though the defendant's conduct,
considered in the aggregate, only caused harm to a small percentage of the
plaintiff class. Hence, instrumentalist analyses of loss-of-chance cases
have tended to center on a search for ways to sidestep the 'formal' requirement of causation while avoiding, or at least dampening, this policy
dilemma. Malone apparently concluded that the courts were pursuing an
ad hoc dampening strategy when they abandoned causation only in certain
cases that were not likely to repeat themselves, and that featured particularly awful defendants whose conduct already warranted greater sanction
anyway. Twerski and Sebok, by contrast, aim to eliminate the dilemma by
calling for courts to implement pro ratacompensation in the gun litigation
context.
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Have Twerski and Sebok offered a sound policy prescription? We do
not know. Certainly, they have not even attempted to address the myriad
policy concerns that gun control advocates and opponents debate. Even in
the context of tort policy, they have said little about issues that instrumentalists would regard as important, including whether the scheme ofpro rata
compensation would lead to over- or under-litigation; whether courts can
handle the administrative burden presented by the scheme; whether juries
would operate within a sufficient set of process constraints such that they
could be relied upon to make accurate assessments of probabilities and
damages; whether the proposal is one that ought to be adopted not just as a
patch for a particular sort of negligence claim, but as a substitute for all of
tort law. For our purposes, it is enough to take notice of the type of issue
now under consideration: is the replacement of the requirement of proof of
causation with apro ratacompensation scheme sound policy? Plainly, this
is not a question about what tort law has to say with regard to the negligent
marketing litigation.
Twerski's and Sebok's seemingly effortless yet altogether awkward
jump from embedded legal analysis to bare policy prescription is an especially dramatic example of instrumentalist scholars' conflation of the law
of torts with the ends it is supposed to serve. By contrast, even instrumentalist-inspired courts tend to recognize that there may be other concernsfor example, rule-of-law concerns for accuracy and predictability--that
warrant developing doctrines that prevent the achievement of a perfect
alignment between tort doctrine and the achievement of certain goals.'
Neither is the Second Restatement of Torts-a document heavily influenced by instrumentalism--prepared to treat the causation element as
cavalierly as do Twerski and Sebok.'
Of course, it should go without saying that there are many viable competitors to the instrumentalist theory of torts that insist upon the centrality
of causation to tort law. The most obvious candidates are corrective justice
theories. 2 Alternatively, we have argued that tort law is best understood
as a distinctive branch of private law that empowers certain wronged indi-

21. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,917-18 (Cal. 1968) (en bane) (citing concerns over false
claims and uncertain damage awards as grounds for limiting recovery to a limited class of plaintiffs
claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress).
22. See RESTAT uNT (SE OND) OF TORTS § 430, at 426 (1965) (setting out the requirement of
proof ofcausation as a black letter principle ofnegligence law).
23. See, e.g., ARTHURRIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSBIUTY, AND THE LAW 82-83 (1999) (arguing
against liability for the mere imposition of risk without causation of injury); ERNEST . WEma, THE
IDEA o PRI ATE LAW 1-2 (1995) (arguing for centrality of causation to private law); Richard Epstein,
A Theory of StrictLiability 2 . LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973) (arguing tha a rich understanding of
causation lies at the heart of tort doctrine); Perry, supranote 16, at 330-39 (arguing againmt lIability for
the mere imposition ofrisk without causation of injury).
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viduals to seek redress against those who have wronged them.' On either
of these approaches, causation is not understood as a mere formality; a tool
to be placed back in the tool box when it no longer helps attain the ends of
deterrence and compensation. Rather, it is regarded as forming part of the
bedrock on which stands the basic distinction between the private law of
tort and the public law of regulation or redistribution.'
In sum, there is a variety of instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist accounts of tort that, contrary to the view espoused by Twerski and Sebok,
grant causation a central place in the law. Our point in making this observation is not to defend one of these alternatives. Rather, it is to take notice
of the terrain on which the argument is taking place. In arguing that their
pro rata scheme should replace traditional causation analysis because it
serves the goals of deterrence and compensation, Twerski and Sebok are
arguing on grounds of policy and theory, not law.
V.
Once it is understood that the pro ratascheme favored by Twerski and
Sebok cannot be construed as a natural application of tort law, we gain a
clearer view of decisions such as Hamilton. To be sure, there are some
close questions raised by suits alleging negligent marketing of guns: for
example, whether it is appropriate to recognize a duty of careful marketing
owed by gun manufacturers to shooting victims. But the cause-in-fact issue does not appear to be one of them. Of course, this still leaves the
question of whether the courts may or ought to undertake radical law revision in these cases. But now, at least, we understand the question for
which we seek an answer.
In part because they purport to make their case on the law, Twerski and
Sebok seem content to assume that the policy question is easily answered
in favor of permitting judicial law revision. We earlier noted some potential objections to the substance of their proposed scheme. We conclude by
noting two reasons that counsel against its being presently implemented by
the courts.
Our first concern applies only to decisions rendered in federal courts
and is a familiar one. As long as the doctrine of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins' remains good law, it provides a substantial argument against
24. For articulations of this view, see generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, and Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs andRecourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998).

25. This is not to say that either a corrective justice or a 'redress' model is incapable of accommodating burden-shifting and other devices by which courts can reduce the height of the hurdle set by the
causation requirement. See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, CorrectheJustice In An Age of
Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND U.S. TORT LAW (Gerald Postema ed., forthcoming 2000) (arguing that

certain instances of burden-shifting are consistent with corrective justice and civil recourse theory).
26. 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
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federal courts undertaking innovations of the sort apparently undertaken by
Judge Weinstein in Hamilton. As the Fifth Circuit has noted in striking
down attempts at innovative mass proceedings in asbestos cases, federal
courts have good reason to be cautious even about subtle, much less radical, revisions of the causation requirement recognized in state tort law.7
Judge Weinstein's suggestion that the issues in Hamilton be certified by
the Second Circuit to the New York Court of Appeals reflects an appreciation of these concerns. 8 Were the Second Circuit not simply to reverse on
duty, causation, or market share liability, it surely ought to accede to his
suggestion?8
Our second note of caution is not rooted in federalism, but rather a legal process concern about the appropriate occasion for radical judicial law
revision. To flesh out this point, it may be helpful to contrast the current
status of the New York gun litigation with the posture of an earlier decision
that succeeded in effecting a significant change in New York's (and the
nation's) tort law: MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co 0
When MacPherson came to the Court of Appeals, it did so against the
backdrop of a line of cases that had seriously qualified the privity rule,"1
and with a strong factual record. Indeed, one may speculate that the majority was comfortable upholding the plaintiff's verdict in part because the
evidence supported a finding that the prospect of injury to product-users
such as Mr. MacPherson was "not merely possible, but probable."32 This
not only had the effect of legitimating the holding in the case, it also permitted the court to craft quite carefully its initial statement of the duty that
manufacturers would henceforth owe to consumers. Indeed, it went to
great lengths to specify that they owed an obligation to inspect for defects

27. See In re Fiberboard, 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting trial procedure of atrapolating class-wide damages from sample trials on the ground that it changes the substance of Teams tort

law by permitting recovery without proof of causation).
28. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802, 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
29. See also McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F3d 148, 157-75 (2d Cir. 1997) (Caabres, 1., dissent-

ing) (arguing for greater use of certification in the context of a products liability action). The issue of
the propriety of applying market share liability on the facts of Hamilton is beyond the scope of this
Comment We note, however, that if the Second Circuit wcre to extend market share liability to this
case, it would be taking a more aggressive position than the one recently adopted by the Appellate

Division. Cf.Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (App. Div. 1999), v. to app.
den. (2000) (refusing to apply market share liability in suit against lead paint manufa turers on various
grounds, including lack of identity between different defendants' products).
30. 111 NE. 1051 (N.Y. 1916). We note that Judge Weinstein suggests in Hamilton that his ruling
is very much in the spirit of MacPherson. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 821-22. As we suggest
below, this may be a fair application of MacPhersonon the issue of the duty element, although we have
serious doubts that Hamilton itself is an appropriate vehicle through which to articulate tha duty.
31. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 19, at 1814-16 (discussing )AacPharon's use of precedent).
32. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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only when they had reason to know that the product would be used by a
person other than the purchaser, without new tests, and under circumstances where such use entailed a probability of injury.33
Now contrast the gun litigation. Thus far, there have been two reported jury verdicts, Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc.,34 in which the jury
found insufficient evidence of causation, and Hamilton, in which the jury
made a dubious finding of causation. In the language of mass torts scholarship, the tort of negligent marketing has not yet matured, either in terms
of supporting data or in terms of its underlying legal theory.35 As a result,
the Second Circuit (or the New York Court of Appeals, if the issues in
Hamilton are certified), is now facing the first of what might be a steady
stream of cases, and one with an extremely weak record. Given this, it will
be difficult even for a court inclined to permit liability to craft an opinion
that offers a convincing rationale for imposing liability, and that adequately
describes and limits the duty being imposed on gun manufacturers.
In drawing this contrast, we do not mean to advocate wholesale rejection of negligent marketing claims against gun manufacturers. Indeed, we
are concerned that too strong an adverse ruling at this stage might prematurely shut off a fruitful line of development within the common law of
tort. Thus, if a court grants the validity of our contrast between Hamilton
and MacPherson,yet suspects that there is some merit to one or another
version of the plaintiffs' underlying theories and claims, it must identify a
resolution that is sensitive to these competing concerns.
One solution that holds itself out would be to uphold (if only in dicta)
Hamilton's ruling on the duty issue, but to reverse on causation.36 This
would signal a willingness to entertain subsequent litigation that will in
turn permit more investigation and development of facts and legal theories
by litigants, public interest groups, and government agencies. In addition,
to the extent that visible private litigation provides a salutary pressure on
legislatures and agencies to address rather than ignore the socially destructive aspects of gun sales, it allows such pressure to continue to build. At
the same time, such a ruling will also indicate to future plaintiffs that they
will have to offer more by way of proof, or an alternatively crafted theory
of liability, before they can prevail. And obviously it avoids the extreme of
implementing a full blown, judicially administered compensation scheme
33. See id.

34. No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); see generallyTimothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and
the UncertainFuture of Negligent Marketing ClaimsAgainst Firearms Manufacturers,64 BROOK. L.

REV. 681 (1998) (recounting carefully the trial and outcome of the case).
35. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-02 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 867 (1995) (granting a writ of mandamus decertilying a mass tort class action in part on the
ground that consolidated resolution was premature because the litigants and courts had not had sufficient opportunity to develop and test the evidence and novel negligence theories).
36. That is, assuming the reviewing court agrees with Twerski's and Sebok's assessment of the
evidence on causation.

2000]

CONCERNV FOR CAUSE

that threatens to rip apart the fabric of the common law of tort. Given the
current state of play in the litigation of negligent marketing cases, this
pragmatic-yet-cautious approach seems to us more in keeping with the
spirit of the common law than a simple dismissal of plaintiffs' claims on
the one hand, or the outright embrace of a public law model of pro rata
compensation on the other.
VI. CONCLUSION

Twerski and Sebok begin their analysis by insisting on the axiomatic
nature of the causation requirement for tort law. Echoing Cardozo," they
draw a bright line distinction between private and public law:
"[c]ulpability in the air," they insist, "is not the business of tort law, but of
public law."38 Causation, they further stress, is "not just a mere technicality, but an element that is equal to duty and breach." ' Likewise, they conclude their article by criticizing the awards of full compensatory damages
in cases like Hamilton, maintaining that their scheme of pro ratarecovery
defends the integrity of negligence law against the "creati[on] of a degraded standard of causation."40
However well-intentioned, and even if tenable at the level of policy,
the proposal put forth by Twerski and Sebok necessarily participates in the
very degradation they decry. If they are right about the evidence presented
in cases like Hamilton, the problem with permitting recovery is emphatically not, as they suggest, that the evidence of causation is "far too speculative to allow for full recovery;"' it is far too speculative to permit any
recovery. In making this point, we do not advocate that courts slam the
door on negligent marketing claims against gun manufacturers. Rather, our
point is that permitting recovery in these cases would require a massive
exercise in ad hoc judicial policymaking; an exercise that, in their present
posture, the negligent marketing cases cannot sustain.

37. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99,99 (N.Y. 1928) ("'Proofof negligence in the air,
so to speak, will not do.'") (quoting SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 455 (11th ed.

1920)).
38. Twerski & Sebok, supranote 1, at 1379.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1409.
41. Id.
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